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ABSTRACT 
 
Korean listed companies adopted International financial reporting standards (IFRS) in 2011 mandatorily. The IFRS 
adoption modifies corporate financial reporting structure and further it can affect managers’ incentive for disclosing 
their earnings forecasts. We investigate the association between IFRS adoption and likelihood of management 
earnings forecasts. From the empirical results, we find that mandatory IFRS adopted companies are less likely to issue 
their earnings forecasts after IFRS adoption. It implies that investors’ belief about management earnings forecasts as 
useful information is weakened after IFRS adoption compare to pre-IFRS adoption period. Therefore, managers’ 
incentive for providing earnings forecasts decreases. This study will contribute to academics and disclosure-related 
practitioners by reporting how IFRS adoption makes an influence to managers’ incentive of management earnings 
forecasts issuance. We also believe that the empirical evidence may shed some lights on the understanding of the 
spillover effect of IFRS adoption to management earnings forecasts.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
his paper investigates the influence of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption on 
likelihood of management earnings forecasts in Korea. Through the currency financial crisis of Korea 
in 1997, Korean financial authorities highlighted the importance of accounting transparency and applied 
International Accounting Standard(IAS) and IFRS to Korean GAAP (K-GAAP), however they modified some items 
of IAS and IFRS to fit Korean market conditions. For the reason, foreign investors’ credibility of Korean firms’ 
financial statements under K-GAAP was not improved as much as they intended and also Korean discount, the amount 
by which foreign investors underestimate Korean firm value, was still existed. Hereby, Korean financial authorities 
prepared to adopt IFRS from 2006 for giving complete faith in accounting transparency to the foreign investors and 
eliminating Korean discount. Eventually, they decided to conduct mandatory IFRS adoption targeting all listed 
companies in 2011 and they permit early IFRS adoption in 2009 or 2010 for the companies which want to adopt IFRS 
voluntarily (Choi and Rhee, 2015). 
 
In this study, we perform Difference-in-Differences (DID) test for controlling time fixed effects at the mandatory IFRS 
adoption year of 20112. In the DID test, we use firms adopted IFRS voluntarily in 2009 or 2010 as a control group and 
compare them with firms which adopted IFRS mandatorily in 2011. Using 12,897 Korean firm data from 2003 to 
2013, we investigate the effect of IFRS adoption on likelihood of management earnings forecasts. From the empirical 
results, we find that there is a significantly negative association between the years following mandatory IFRS adoption 
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2 DID test is the most common statistical technic for controlling the time fixed effect in IFRS study. (Li and Yang, 2016; Ng et al, 2012; Choi, 
2013). 
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of firms mandated IFRS in 2011 and likelihood of management earnings forecasts. The negative association supports 
the argument that managers are less likely to provide management earnings forecasts after IFRS adoption. On the 
other hand, there is no significant association between the years following mandatory IFRS adoption of firms adopted 
IFRS voluntarily in 2009 or 2010 and likelihood of management earnings forecasts. It explains that the reduction 
phenomenon of management earnings forecasts is the result of mandatory IFRS adoption rather than time fixed effect 
in 2011. We perform additional tests for examining whether our results may be affected by transitory effect in 2011 
and financial crisis effect from 2008 to 2009. From the transitory effect test, we report that the reduction phenomenon 
of management earnings forecasts is continuously observed after mandatory IFRS adoption in 2011. Also, the negative 
association between the years following mandatory IFRS adoption of firms mandated IFRS in 2011 and likelihood of 
management earnings forecasts is still existed after controlling financial crisis effect.   
 
Overall, our empirical results suggest the substitution effect of accounting information from IFRS adoption. IFRS 
adoption enhances the level of firm’s mandatory disclosure, and therefore accounting information users are able to 
access more accounting information after IFRS adoption. In this circumstance, the usefulness of management earnings 
forecasts, a type of voluntary disclosure, is weakened, and eventually managers are less likely to provide management 
earnings forecasts.  
 
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, to our knowledge, there is no previous evidence 
on the direct negative association between IFRS adoption and likelihood of management earnings forecasts. We 
believe it will be helpful to academics and disclosure-related practitioners by reporting how IFRS adoption makes an 
influence to managers’ incentive of management earnings forecasts issuance. Next, this study also shows that IFRS 
adoption affects not only mandatory financial reporting but furthermore voluntary reporting. We also believe that the 
empirical evidence may shed some lights on the understanding of the spillover effect of IFRS adoption to management 
earnings forecasts.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 discusses the prior researches and develops our reasoning. 
Section 3 provides the research design and sample selection criteria. Section 4 reports the empirical results from the 
model estimation. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 IFRS and Management Earnings Forecasts 
 
Recent IFRS studies about management earnings forecasts report inconsistent results on the association between IFRS 
adoption and likelihood of management earnings forecasts. Ng et al. (2012) studies the influence of IFRS adoption on 
management earnings forecasts. They use firm data of 18 countries which adopted IFRS and firm data of 17 countries 
which did not adopted IFRS. After their empirical tests, they report that the firms of IFRS adopted countries are more 
likely to provide management earnings forecasts than the firms of IFRS un-adopted countries. Especially, likelihood 
of management earnings forecasts is more pronounced in the countries with strong legal system and regulation. They 
explain that IFRS is principle based accounting standards and it faces more litigation risks than rule based accounting 
standards, and therefore firms are more likely to provide management earnings forecasts for reducing litigation risks 
under IFRS. Also, they argue that market participants request more information under IFRS and therefore firms provide 
more voluntary information for capital market demand. However, firms listed in foreign markets reduce management 
earnings forecasts after IFRS adoption.  
 
Li and Yang (2016) analyze firms from 20 countries adopted IFRS mandatorily and firms from 7 countries did not 
adopted IFRS mandatorily. They report that a significant increase in likelihood of management earnings forecasts after 
mandatory IFRS adoption. They propose three channels through which IFRS adoption can affect firm’s disclosures 
incentives in response to increased capital market demand. However, they did not find empirical evidence that firms 
issue more management earnings forecasts after IFRS adoption due to the increased litigation risk.  
 
Firth et al. (2013) consider that the process of Initial Public Offering (IPO) is a setting of high information asymmetry, 
and they examine the accuracy of management earnings forecasts after IFRS adoption using Australian IPO 
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prospectuses data. They report that level of absolute forecasts error of IPO firms is increased after IFRS adoption, and 
explain the results that management earnings forecasts prepared in accordance with IFRS are difficult to make.  
 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
Managers have either an incentive to provide more or less management earnings forecasts after IFRS adoption than 
before. The incentive to issue less management earnings forecasts are following. Ng et al. (2012) explain that 
usefulness of voluntary disclosure information may be weakened as the level of mandatory disclosure information is 
improved after IFRS adoption. Especially, they reported that managers’ incentive to provide less management earnings 
forecasts are stronger at the firms with relatively high level of mandatory disclosure information. Also, Li and Yang 
(2016) explain that the circumstance of IFRS which is principle based causes higher litigation risks to companies and 
therefore managers are less likely to issue management earnings forecasts which include uncertain future performance 
information for evading litigation risk. Einhorn (2005) argues that managers would like to save the expenses of 
voluntary disclosure when the level of mandatory disclosure is reinforced, and eventually managers are less likely to 
provide voluntary disclosures.  
 
On the other hand, the incentive to issue more management earnings forecasts are following. Ng et al. (2012) argue 
that investors ask for additional information as the volume of mandatory reporting information is increased from IFRS 
adoption, and therefore managers provide more voluntary disclosure information for the investors. In addition, Li and 
Yang (2016) suggest that firms have an incentive to issue more management earnings forecasts for inducing a greater 
number of foreign investors after IFRS adoption.  
 
Thus, it is hard to discern the exact direction of association between IFRS adoption and likelihood of management 
earnings forecasts. Hence, we set a hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis: There is a significant association between Mandatory IFRS adoption and likelihood of management 
earnings forecasts. 
 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Model Specification 
 
In this study, we perform DID test for controlling the several institutional effects at the mandatory IFRS adoption 
period. We use firms which adopted IFRS voluntarily in 2009 or 2010 as a control group and compare them with firms 
which adopted IFRS mandatorily in 2011. To test our hypothesis on the association between IFRS adoption and 
likelihood of management earnings forecasts, we construct an indicator variable (FOCR) that equals to 1 if 
management earnings forecasts are issued, 0 otherwise (Ng et al. 2012; Yoo et al. 2013). The dependent variable of 
FOCR is a dummy variable and therefore we build a logit model below. MAND is an indicator variable whether a firm 
adopt IFRS mandatorily or voluntarily. Both MPOST and VPOST are indicator variables of the period after IFRS 
adoption. MPOST is the years following mandatory IFRS adoption of firms mandated IFRS in 2011 while VPOST is 
the years following mandatory IFRS adoption of firms adopted IFRS voluntarily in 2009 or 2010.  
 
We use control variables of management earnings forecasts determinants. To control the demand of investors for 
corporate transparency and firms size, we include total number of analysts’ following (ANALY) and natural log of total 
assets (SIZE) (Rhee and Moon, 2015; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Kasznik and Lev, 1995). The logarithmic value of 
market to book ratio (MB) is a control variable for the firm’s growth opportunity set (Bamber & Cheon, 1998). To 
control a firm’s information uncertainty, solvency, and persistence of negative earnings, we include the variables of 
OIVOL, LEV, and LOSS (Simunic, 1980; Reynold et al., 2001; Hayn, 1995;). We add BIG4 and ACC for controlling 
auditor quality and potential earnings management (Palmrose, 1986; Dechow et al., 1995; Woo et al., 2015). 
Additionally, we use CONT to control the effect of a firm’ continuous report of consolidated financial statements before 
mandatory IFRS adoption. 
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Model #1 
 
FOCR = β0 + β1 MAND + β2 MPOST + β3 VPOST + β4 ANALY + β5 SIZE + β6 MB + β7 OIVOL  
+ β 8LEV + β 9LOSS + β10 BIG4 + β11 ACC + β12 CONTINUE + INDUSTRY + e 
 
where 
 
FOCR An indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm issues at least one management earnings forecasts, 0 
otherwise. 
MAND An indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm adopts IFRS mandatorily in 2011, 0 otherwise. 
MPOST An indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm adopts IFRS mandatorily and year is 2011 or after, 0 
otherwise. 
VPOST An indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm adopts IFRS voluntarily and year is 2011 or after, 0 
otherwise. 
ANALY The total number of analysts’ following. 
SIZE Natural log of total assets. 
MB The logarithmic value of market to book ratio 
OIVOL The standard deviation of operating income scaled by average total assets. 
LEV Total leverage scaled by total assets. 
LOSS An indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm reports a loss in the current period, 0 otherwise 
BIG4 An indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm hires a Big4 auditor, 0 otherwise. 
ACC Accrual; a measure of firm-level financial transparency. 
CONT An indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm provide consolidated financial statements 
continuously before mandatory IFRS adoption. 
INDUSTRY Industry dummy variables. 
 
3.4 Sample Selection 
 
Our empirical tests are based on 12,897 Korean firm-year observations from 2003 to 2013 fiscal year, which satisfy 
the following selection criteria: (1) financial statement data with a positive book value of equity available on KisValue 
database; (2) all of the proxies are available; (3) firms in non-financial industry; (4) fiscal year ended December 31.3 
We collect the information of management earnings forecasts from Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System 
(DART) of Financial Supervisory Service in Korea. Table 1 shows the sample distribution of the final firm-year 
observations for our empirical tests. We present the observations by fiscal year in Panel A and the observations by 
industry group in Panel B. In Panel A of Table 1, 14.10% of total sample provided management earnings forecasts 
while 85.90% did not. All Korean listed companies were required to adopt IFRS in 2011 mandatorily. If they requested 
to adopt IFRS in advance, they were able to adopt IFRS either in 2009 or 2010 voluntarily. Panel B shows that 
manufacturing industry occupies the largest portion of 70.94% in the total sample.  
 
  
																																								 																				
3 This study sets up the testing periods from 2003 because Korean listed companies actively adopted K-GAAP which was established by IFRS 
basis from 2003.   
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Table 1. Sample Distribution 
Panel A Sample distribution by fiscal year 
Year 
Management Earnings forecasts Issued Management Earnings forecasts Un-issued 
Total Mandatory 
Adoption 
Voluntary 
Adoption Subtotal 
Mandatory 
Adoption 
Voluntary 
Adoption Subtotal 
GAAP IFRS GAAP IFRS GAAP IFRS GAAP IFRS 
2003 79  5  84 (9.46%) 773  31  
804 
(90.54%) 
888 
(100.00%) 
2004 119  6  125 (13.13%) 791  36  
827 
(86.87%) 
952 
(100.00%) 
2005 202  9  211 (20.93%) 760  37  
797 
(79.07%) 
1,008 
(100.00%) 
2006 226  10  236 (22.04%) 800  35  
835 
(77.96%) 
1,071 
(100.00%) 
2007 226  9  235 (20.56%) 868  40  
908 
(79.44%) 
1,143 
(100.00%) 
2008 196  9  205 (16.75%) 981  38  
1,019 
(83.25%) 
1,224 
(100.00%) 
2009 147  6 2 155 (12.08%) 1,082  35 11 
1,128 
(87.92%) 
1,283 
(100.00%) 
2010 155   4 159 (11.80%) 1,140   49 
1,189 
(88.20%) 
1,348 
(100.00%) 
2011  153  6 159 (11.34%)  1,195  48 
1,243 
(88.66%) 
1,402 
(100.00%) 
2012  175  11 186 (12.79%)  1,223  45 
1,268 
(87.21%) 
1,454 
(100.00%) 
2013  58  5 63 (5.60%)  1,023  38 
1,061 
(94.40%) 
1,124 
(100.00%) 
Total 1,350 386 54 28 1,818 (14.10%) 
7,195 3,441 252 191 11,079 
(85.90%) 
12,897 
(100.00%) 1,736 82 10,636 443 
 
Panel B. Sample distribution by Industry 
Industry Number of Observations Percentage (%) 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishery 44 0.34 
Mining 20 0.16 
Manufacturing 9,149 70.94 
Electricity, gas, steam and water supply 113 0.88 
Environmental service 39 0.30 
Construction 513 3.97 
Wholesale and retail trade 842 6.53 
Transportation 236 1.83 
Lodging and restaurant 11 0.09 
Publishing, broadcasting, and media 
service 1,157 8.97 
Real estate and leasing service 21 0.16 
Professional, scientific and technical 
activities 489 3.78 
Facilities management and supporting 
service 134 1.04 
Education service 63 0.49 
Art, sports, and recreation service 55 0.43 
Organization, and other personal service 11 0.09 
Total 12,897 100.00 
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics about likelihood of management earnings forecasts, IFRS adoption related 
variables, and other control variables. The mean of management earnings forecasts likelihood (FOCR) is 0.141 which 
indicates that average 14.10% of companies issue management earnings forecasts. MAND, MPOST, and VPOST are 
IFRS adoption related variables. The mean of MAND is 0.959 implies that 95.9% Korean listed companies adopt IFRS 
mandatorily in 2011. The mean of MPOST and VPOST are 0.297 and 0.012 respectively. It suggests that average 29.7% 
Korean listed companies that adopted IFRS mandatorily issue management earnings forecasts after IFRS adoption year 
of 2011 while 0.012% Korean listed companies that adopted IFRS voluntarily issue management earnings forecasts 
after the year. Distribution of the other control variables is generally consistent with prior Korean studies.  
 
Table 2. Statistics Description 
Variables Mean Std. 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% Obs. 
FOCR 0.141 0.348 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 12,897 
MAND 0.959 0.198 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 12,897 
MPOST 0.297 0.457 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 12,897 
VPOST 0.012 0.108 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 12,897 
ANALY 0.334 2.193 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 14.000 12,897 
SIZE 24.944 1.514 22.293 23.914 24.689 25.652 29.857 12,897 
MB 1.288 1.232 0.173 0.554 0.899 1.549 7.672 12,897 
OIVOL 0.047 0.045 0.003 0.019 0.034 0.059 0.247 12,897 
LEV 0.461 0.262 0.040 0.262 0.441 0.617 1.391 12,897 
LOSS 0.251 0.434 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 12,897 
BIG4 0.542 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 12,897 
ACC -0.031 0.119 -0.528 -0.076 -0.021 0.027 0.284 12,897 
CONT 0.493 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 12,897 
 
4.2 Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlations among likelihood of management earnings forecasts (FOCR), IFRS adoption 
related variables (MAND, MPOST, and VPOST) and other variables. In table 3, FOCR is negatively correlated with 
MPOST, and it implies that mandatory IFRS adopted companies are less likely to provide management earnings 
forecasts after IFRS adoption. On the other hand, there is no significant between FOCR and VPOST that suggests IFRS 
adoption does not make a significant influence on management earnings forecasts likelihood of voluntary IFRS adopted 
companies. However, as the implication of the univariate result appears to be limited, we perform the multivariate logit 
analyses to examine the overall association between likelihood of management earnings forecasts (FOCR) and IFRS 
adoption related variables (MAND, MPOST, and VPOST) coupled with control variables in section 4.3. Most control 
variables are correlated each other as expected. 
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Table 3. Univariate Correlation among the Main Variables 
 FOCR MAND MPOST VPOST ANALY SIZE MB OIVOL LEV LOSS BIG4 ACC 
MAND -0.009             
MPOST -0.075  0.134            
VPOST 0.001  -0.532  -0.071           
ANALY 0.096  -0.117  0.170  0.186          
SIZE 0.273  -0.106  0.046  0.064  0.361         
MB 0.140  -0.037  0.031  0.013  0.099  0.258        
OIVOL -0.015  0.003  -0.050  -0.019  -0.050  -0.143  0.275       
LEV 0.087  -0.016  -0.039  0.006  0.013  0.038  0.111  0.068      
LOSS -0.100  -0.003  0.031  0.008  -0.047  -0.224  0.087  0.256  0.116     
BIG4 0.114  -0.027  0.021  0.025  0.116  0.335  0.011  -0.081  0.013  -0.089    
ACC 0.039  0.019  0.015  -0.002  0.024  0.102  -0.066  -0.189  -0.058  -0.401  0.032   
CONT 0.076  -0.042  -0.059  0.019  0.093  0.314  -0.052  -0.148  0.091  -0.047  0.155  0.016  
Obs. 12,897  12,897  12,897  12,897  12,897  12,897  12,897  12,897  12,897  12,897  12,897  12,897  
Note: Bold numbers indicate the significance level at 5 percent levels or better (two-tailed). 
 
4.3 Multivariate Analysis 
 
Table 4 presents the results from a multivariate logit analysis for investigating the effect of IFRS adoption on likelihood 
of management earnings forecasts. In Panel A, likelihood of management earnings forecasts (FOCR) is positively 
associated with the companies that adopted IFRS mandatorily (MAND) at one percent or less of significance level (t-
stat=3.40). On the other hand, it is negatively associated with the years following mandatory IFRS adoption of firms 
mandated IFRS in 2011 (MPOST) at one percent or less of significance level (t-stat=-0.660). These positive and 
negative associations suggest that the firms adopted IFRS mandatorily are more likely to issue management earnings 
forecasts before IFRS adoption but they changed to reduce the issuance of manage earnings forecasts after IFRS 
adoption. We interpret that the results as the substitution effect of accounting information from IFRS adoption. IFRS 
adoption enhanced the level of firm’s mandatory disclosure, and therefore accounting information users are able to 
access more accounting information after IFRS adoption. In this circumstance, the usefulness of management earnings 
forecasts is reduced and eventually managers are less likely to provide management earnings forecasts.  
 
In addition, there is no significant association between the years following mandatory IFRS adoption of firms adopted 
IFRS voluntarily in 2009 or 2010 (VPOST) and likelihood of management earnings forecasts (FOCR). The reduction 
phenomenon of management earnings forecasts after 2011 is not observed from voluntary IFRS adopters. It supports 
the argument that the reduction phenomenon of management earnings forecasts is the result of IFRS adoption rather 
than time fixed effect in 2011. Specifically, Panel B presents the difference between pre-IFRS period and post-IFRS 
period. Firms adopted IFRS mandatorily in 2011 show the significant difference, but firms adopted IFRS voluntarily 
in 2009 or 2010 do not. Also, before 2011 there is significant difference between firms adopted IFRS mandatorily and 
firms adopted IFRS voluntarily, but after 2011 there is no significant difference between them. Those results in Panel 
B also support that mandatory IFRS adoption affect the reduction of management earnings forecasts.  
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Table 4. Management earnings forecasts likelihood and IFRS adoption 
Panel A. Results of Multivariate Logit Analysis 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: FOCR 
Coef. t-stat. 
INTERCEPT -13.291*** -21.69  
MAND 0.543*** 3.40  
MPOST -0.660*** -9.63  
VPOST -0.229 -0.76  
ANALY 0.011 1.07  
SIZE 0.396*** 18.90  
MB 0.147*** 6.97  
OIVOL 0.414 0.63  
LEV 0.780*** 7.63  
LOSS -0.532*** -6.58  
BIG4 0.234*** 3.84  
ACC 0.203 0.82  
CONTINUE -0.075 -1.25  
Industry Dummy Included 
Pseudo R2 11.65% 
Number of Observations 12,897 
Note: t-statistics are reported in bracket. ***, **, * indicate, respectively, the significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level or better.  
 
 
Panel B. Two-by-Two Analysis: Mandatory IFRS adopted firms Vs. Voluntary IFRS adopted firms 
 Pre-IFRS (2003~2010) Post-IFRS (2011~2013) Difference 
Mandatory IFRS adopted firms -12.748 -13.407 -0.660*** 
Voluntary IFRS adopted firms -13.291 -13.520 -0.229 
Difference -0.543*** -0.112 -0.431 
 
4.4 Additional Tests 
 
We test whether the reduction phenomenon of management earnings forecasts after 2011 is affected by transitory 
effect or financial crisis effect considerably. In Table 5, we add the interaction terms between firms adopted IFRS 
mandatorily and years dummy variables after IFRS mandatory adoption (MAND*YEAR2011, MAND*YEAR2012, and 
MAND*YEAR2013) for controlling transitory effect. We observed the negatively significant association from all three 
interaction terms, and it means that the reduction phenomenon of management earnings forecasts persisted after IFRS 
mandatory adoption. From the additional test 1, we can conclude that the reduction phenomenon is not a result of 
transitory effect in 2011. 
 
Additionally, to test whether financial crisis exerts a significant influence on the reduction of management earnings 
forecasts, we perform the regression and DID tests excluding samples of financial crisis years (2008 and 2009) in 
Table 6. The result of Table 6 is still consistent with the result of the main test in Table 5 even after controlling 
financial crisis effect. Therefore, we can conclude that the reduction phenomenon is not depended on financial crisis 
effect. 
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Table 5. Additional Test 1: Controlling Transitory Effect 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable: FOCR Coef. t-stat. 
INTERCEPT -13.247*** (-21.898) 
MAND 0.595***  (4.257) 
MAND×YEAR2011 -0.602***  (-6.161) 
MAND×YEAR012 -0.453***  (-4.807) 
MAND×YEAR2013 -1.162***  (-8.033) 
ANALY 0.009  (0.915) 
SIZE 0.393***  (18.666) 
MB 0.147***  (7.014) 
OIVOL 0.366  (0.564) 
LEV 0.768***  (7.546) 
LOSS -0.538***  (-6.648) 
BIG4 0.238***  (3.902) 
ACC 0.190   (0.778) 
CONTINUE -0.075   (-1.238) 
Industry Dummy Included 
Pseudo R2 11.85% 
Number of Observations 12,897 
Note: t-statistics are reported in bracket. ***, **, * indicate, respectively, the significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level or better.  
 
 
Table 6. Additional Test 2: Controlling Financial Crisis effect 
Panel A. Results of Multivariate Logit Analysis 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: FOCR 
Coef. t-stat. 
INTERCEPT -13.443*** -19.18  
MAND 0.595*** 3.18  
MPOST -0.697*** -9.79  
VPOST -0.212 -0.67  
ANALY 0.013 1.24  
SIZE 0.399*** 16.73  
MB 0.128*** 5.29  
OIVOL 0.889 1.24  
LEV 0.808*** 7.05  
LOSS -0.589*** -6.29  
BIG4 0.176*** 2.60  
ACC 0.348 1.24  
CONTINUE -0.083 -1.22  
INDUSTRY DUMMY Included 
Pseudo R2 11.63% 
Number of Observations 10,390 
Note: t-statistics are reported in bracket. ***, **, * indicate, respectively, the significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level or better.  
 
 
Panel B. Two-by-Two Analysis: Mandatory IFRS adopted firms Vs. Voluntary IFRS adopted firms 
 Pre-IFRS (2003~2010) Post-IFRS (2011~2013) Difference 
Mandatory IFRS adopted firms -12.848 -13.545 -0.697*** 
Voluntary IFRS adopted firms -13.443 -13.655 -0.212 
Difference -0.595*** -0.110 -0.485 
 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2016 Volume 32, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1706 The Clute Institute 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines the association between IFRS adoption and likelihood of management earnings forecasts. It 
provides evidences as to whether mandatory IFRS adoption in Korea affects to managers’ incentive of voluntary 
disclosure. We find that mandatory IFRS adopted companies are less likely to issue their earnings forecasts after 
mandatory IFRS adoption in Korea. It implies that investor’s belief about management earnings forecasts as useful 
information is weakened after IFRS adoption compare to pre-IFRS adoption period.  
 
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that our findings may have following caveats. First, there may be other omitted factors 
which bias our empirical results. We cannot rule out the possibility that our results largely depend on measurement 
criteria. Second, this is an early study of IFRS adoption effect in Korea and the post IFRS period of our firm-year 
observations is only three years in this study. Therefore, it is challenging to say that our result can last for a length 
period of time.  
 
Despite these caveats, this study will contribute to academics and disclosure-related practitioners by reporting how 
IFRS adoption makes an influence to managers’ incentive of management earnings forecasts issuance. We also believe 
that the empirical evidence may shed some lights on the understanding of the spillover effect of IFRS adoption to 
management earnings forecasts. 
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